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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TOKYO 001263

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SUBJECT: DEPUTY SECRETARY STEINBERG'S MEETING WITH
OPPOSITION DPJ LEADERSHIP

Classified By: CDA James Zumwalt for reasons 1.4 b/d.

Summary

1. (C) In a June 1 meeting with Deputy Secretary Steinberg, opposition Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) President Yukio Hatoyama said that his key priority, after securing an electoral victory, is building a cooperative relationship with the United States to confront the global challenges of nuclear disarmament, climate change, and the world financial situation. On recent DPRK provocations, Hatoyama said his party hopes for a strong message from the UNSC, powerful sanctions, and cooperation among the United States, Korea, and Japan to draw China into a response. Secretary General Katsuya Okada and Vice President Seiji Maehara positively noted the President's Prague speech, raised the question of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, and asked about Ambassador-designate to Japan John Roos. End summary.

DPJ's Hatoyama, Okada Lead Meeting

2. (SBU) In his June 1 meeting with the opposition Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) leadership, Deputy Secretary Steinberg was greeted by DPJ Secretary General Katsuya Okada, who opened the meeting. President Hatoyama, Okada explained, was concluding the DPJ's once-a-year consultation with the Japanese Business Federation (Keidanren), Japan's leading business organization. Exchanging pleasantries, the Deputy Secretary, Okada and DPJ Vice President Seiji Maehara noted their previous meetings in Washington and acknowledged the importance of sharing perspectives on issues of common concern.

Tell Us About Ambassador-Designate Roos

3. (C) Okada said he had agreed to leave the DPRK, the most important topic to be discussed, until President Hatoyama arrived. He and Maehara then asked about Ambassador-designate to Japan John Roos. Why was he chosen, added Maehara, rather than Joseph Nye?

4. (C) The Deputy Secretary said that Mr. Roos would approach Japan in a manner entirely consonant with the views of the President and the Secretary. Elaborating, NSC Senior Director Bader said the President has made it clear in conversations -- including one with Prime Minister Aso -- that no ambassador will have a closer relationship with him than Mr. Roos. They have a long-standing personal relationship, which will give Mr. Roos direct access to the President and his Chief of Staff and will allow him to bypass

the bureaucracy if necessary. In this way, said Amb. Bader, Japan is being seen as a country like the UK or Germany, where U.S. ambassadors are appointed principally based on their personal relationships with the President. As for other candidates, the Deputy Secretary noted members of the press have a tendency to speculate, and while others were held in high regard for various reasons, the President wanted someone close to him.

Non-Proliferation and Nuclear Disarmament

15. (C) Saying that he appreciated the President's Prague speech, Vice President Maehara asked whether the DPRK's recent actions had changed the President's position on nuclear weapons. The short answer is no, said the Deputy Secretary, because the President was explicit that so long as nuclear weapons exist, the United States must maintain a credible nuclear arsenal to guarantee extended deterrence. At the same time, recent events show the importance of non-proliferation efforts, and U.S. efforts toward the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, a ban on the production of fissile material, and follow-on START negotiations with Russia all show the President's credible commitment to Article 6 of the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

16. (C) Secretary General Okada, noting his position may contradict the Japanese government's, stated it would be an important step toward the abolition of nuclear weapons if the nuclear states pledged no first use of the weapons, as well as pledged not to use nuclear weapons on non-nuclear states. Replying that the doctrinal issues on nuclear weapons are

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complex, the Deputy Secretary noted the Administration is conducting a comprehensive policy review. He added, however, that actions are more important than assertions of doctrine and suggested a more meaningful contribution might consist of efforts to reduce the importance and salience of nuclear weapons to overall strategy.

Cooperating on Global Challenges, Response to DPRK

17. (C) Joining the meeting, President Hatoyama outlined his top priorities. First, he said, is ensuring a DPJ victory in upcoming general elections. His next task would be working to forge cooperation between the democracies of Japan and the United States to address global challenges, including nuclear disarmament, climate change, and the world financial situation. He acknowledged the Deputy Secretary's remarks on the strength and importance of the bilateral relationship, our shared values, and the security alliance, and quickly moved to discuss the DPRK's recent actions. Hatoyama welcomed the President's selection of John Roos as Ambassador to Japan and said he looked forward to working with a fellow Stanford graduate.

18. (C) Hatoyama said the most important question is how Japan, the United States, and Korea can cooperate to respond to the DPRK's nuclear tests. Noting the DPJ is still in opposition, he said the party hopes nonetheless the UN Security Council will send the strongest message possible to the DPRK and believes powerful sanctions should be imposed. Moreover, Hatoyama said it is extremely important to encourage China to cooperate and, in some sense, responding to the DPRK is a "China issue." Every effort, he concluded, should be made to draw China into a "cooperative circle."

19. (C) The Deputy Secretary thanked Hatoyama for his comments, saying it is enormously helpful to know that, regardless of elections, there will be no change in Japan's DPRK policy. Referencing the DPRK's recent nuclear test and missile launches, the Deputy Secretary said the DPRK's actions suggest a potentially dangerous future and it is more and more urgent for the other five parties in the Six-Party Process to develop an effective approach to dissuade the DPRK from taking that path. The task with the Chinese, he said,

is to persuade them that the dangers posed by the DPRK's nuclear program outweigh the risks of a destabilized neighbor. China also needs to consider, he added, that an increasingly dangerous DPRK would force Japan, the United States, and others -- individually and collectively -- to take defensive steps China does not want to see.

¶10. (C) Noting his personal view that bank sanctions hit the DPRK hardest, Vice President Maehara asked whether the United States is ready to reinstate financial sanctions. It should not escape people's notice, said the Deputy Secretary, that Treasury Department Under Secretary Stuart Levy is part of the U.S. government delegation.

Meeting Attendees

¶11. (SBU) Besides Hatoyama, Okada, and Maehara, DPJ Diet members and Directors General Hirofumi Hirano (Executive Office) and Tetsundo Iwakuni (International Department) attended the meeting. The Deputy Secretary was joined by the Charge d'Affaires, NSC Senior Director for Asian Affairs Jeffrey Bader, Special Assistant Pamela Park, an interpreter, control officer, and notetaker.

Atmospherics

¶12. (C) This meeting's atmosphere was much more warm and friendly than meetings with former DPJ President Ozawa had been. Under Hatoyama, at least in private meetings, the DPJ appears to be stressing areas of commonality rather than areas of difference.

¶13. (U) Deputy Secretary Steinberg cleared this message.
ZUMWALT